Horse & Buggy Is Not a ‘Vessel’
By Wendell Sherk, Missouri Attorney on Oct 10, 2007 in Bankruptcy Cases & Legislation, Debts Not Dischargeable, Missouri
Damages from a personal injury (or death) caused by drunk (or drugged) driving, flying or operation of a ‘vessel’ are excepted from discharge. But what if the drunk debtor was driving a horse and buggy? In July, a Fort Wayne bankruptcy court concluded a horse and buggy is not a ‘vessel’ and therefore the claim could be wiped out.
For the lawyers out there, it sounds exactly like a typical law school hypothetical: A combination of easy-to-understand legal principles with utterly bizarre facts that force you to “think like a lawyer” (which we all hope means logically and constructively). Unfortunately the fact pattern is all too tragically real and, no doubt, no one was happy to be involved in the case.
During the early hours of New Years 2004, an 18-year old man apparently drove his horse and buggy through an intersection without stopping causing the horse to collide with an on-coming car. A passenger in the car was paralyzed. The young man was charged as a minor in possession of alcohol and failure to stop at a through way. Eventually he found his way into bankruptcy court where the victim sought to deny his discharge of the debt primarily under Section 523(a)(9).
The victim admitted a horse and buggy were not a motor vehicle nor an aircraft under the statute. But they argued it was a ‘vessel’ by pointing to various dictionary definitions which defined a ‘vessel’ as a “container or craft used to hold or transport something.” It’s a remarkably creative argument. But Judge Robert E. Grant concluded this definition proved too much. As he pointed out, such a “container-based” definition of ‘vessel’ would encompass not only the horse and buggy, “but also coffee cups, flower pots, and grocery carts, all of which could cause injury and, quite conceivably, by operated while under the influence. It would also render the surrounding terms — motor vehicle and aircraft — superfluous…”
Instead, Judge Grant looked to the little-referenced Dictionary Act of the U.S. Code (sections 1-6 of Title 1). The answer was very clear in section 3:
The word “vessel” includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.
As Judge Grant concludes, the “DWI exception” to discharge relates to vehicles that transport on “the triad of land, sea and air.” Essentially all land-based motorized vehicles are likely to be covered (as well as planes and boats) but not horse-drawn transport.
Case: In re Schmucker, 2007 W.L. 280886 (Bankr.N.D.Ind. 2007)
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